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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HEIDEMARIE FOULGER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16, 909·

vs.
JOHN C.

FOULGER~

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE.OF THE CASE
'I'h is appeal is from an order by the Honorable Dav id Sam
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, modifying the nroperty
settlement of a divorce decree.

The original qecree was

entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif on October 29,
1975, in the

sam~

court.

An Order to Show Cause and Affidavit

in Re Modification of Decree of Divorce was filed by the
plaintiff-respondent in Novembei, 1979, and

~

hearing was

held by the Court on December 18, 1979.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 4, 1980, the trial court found

paragrap~

5,

the property settlement in the original divorce decree, to
be "inherently unfair," (R.20) and therefore modified the
division of property between the parties.

In its findings

of fact, the Court noted changes of circumstances sufficient
to justify such modification.

(R.20)

The child support

·provision of the original decree was also modified but no
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objection to this was made by the defendant-appellant.

This

appeal is taken solely from the order moditying the property
settlement portion of the decree.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APEAt
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial
court's order modifying the property settlement.

Plaintiff-

respondent seeks an order from this Court remanding the
matter to the trial court to consider awarding plaintiffrespondent additional attorney's fees for defending this
appeal and an order affirming the trial court's decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 29, 1975, a divorce decree was granted to
the plaintiff-respondent, Heidemarie Foulger, hereinafter
referred to as respondent, and the defendant-appellant, John
C. Foulger, hereinafter referred to as appellant.

The

parties used one attorney at the time of the initial proceeding
although it appears that the appellant had talked to his
present counsel prior to arranging to meet with Attorney
Heber Grant Ivins who handled the original divorce (R.86).
At the time the parties appeared in Mr. Ivins' office, the
appellant dictated the terms of the Stipulation (R.99) and
the parties agreed ·to allow the respondent to go forward and
obtain the divorce.
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce created an inequitable and unjust division of the equity in the parties' home.
It awarded all right, title and interest in and to the real·
property and residence to the respondent subject to a partially

-2-
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defined and ever increasing equitable lien in favor of the
appellant.

Paragraph 5 of the Decree had the effect of

requiring respondent to make all payments including the
h6use payment, taxes, insurance, repairs ~nd upkeep on.the
home, while permitting the

appell~nt

to continue to share in

the increasing equity in the home brought about by

paym~nts

made by the respondent and the inflationary economy.

(R.10,11)
I

Furthermore, any improvements to the home made and paid for
by the respondent, were automatically shared on a 50-50
basis by the appellant without any contribution on his part.
Paragraph 5 of the original Decree which was modified

by the· trial court in the proceeding from which this appeal
was taken reads as follows:
5.
The plaintiff is hereby awarded all right,
title and interest in and to the real property
and residence at 195 Nbrth 7th East, Pleasant
Grove, Utah, described as follows, to wit:
Commencing at NE corner of Lot 1, Block 43,
Plat "A", Pl~asant Grove City Survey1 thence
South 111.10 feet; thence West 110.60 feet;
thence North 111.10 feet; thence East 110.10
feet to beginning.
Subject, however, to a lien on said premises in
·behalf of the defendant equal to fifty percent
(50%) of the amount received from any sale in
excess of $17,000.00 which is the purchase price
of said residence.
Defendant is further awarded
a first option to purchase said residence in the
event of sale and apply his equity upon said
purchase price.
Plaintiff is hereby granted the
right to reside in said residence as long as
she desires, but in the event of sale, the above
formula shall apply.
The trial court found that the property settlement was
"inherently unfair"

(R.19,20) and that there had been material
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cnanges in circumstances which further justified the moJif icdtion
of the property settlement paragraph (R.20,21).

These

material changes in circumstances included the fact that
since the date of the Decree, respondent had paid all monthly
payments, taxes and insurance associated with the house
totalling $8,544.00 (R.20).

In addition, respondent had

expended some $2,000.00 in improvements to the property
(R.21) and contemplates making additional improvements to
the home (R.61).

Respondent has been solely responsible for

the maintenance, upkeep and repairs to the home for the past
two or three years although appellant assisted with repairs
and upkeep for approximately two years after the divorce

(R.6i).
Furthermore, appellant attempted to justify paragraph 5
on the basis that he was fearful that the respondent would
take the parties' minor children and return to her native
Germany following the divorce and he wanted to have something
that would induce her to remain. here (R.15,78).

Upon cross-

examination, however, appellant conceded that there was only
one time that the parties even discussed the possibility of
respondent returning to Germany and that was several months
prior to the divorce (R.86).

Respondent denied that the

possibility of her returning to Germany was. ever discussed
or that she had ever indicated she wanted to leave Utah
County (R.99).
The trial court specifically found that the circumstances
had changed from the time of the Decree and that there no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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longer existed any possibility that the respondent would
to Germany with the children (R.20).

retu~

Respondent had not lived

in Germany for more than sixteen. years, she had become a
naturalized U.S. citizen and has _obtained full-time employment
with the Alpine School District teaching U.S. History and
German (R.20).

The Court also found that the respondent has

expressed no desire to return to Germany

and~

in fact,

indicated that she wanted to remain here in the United
States and that her children are American citizens (R.20).
Therefore~

on February 4, 1980, the trial court made an

equitable modification of the property settlement (Paragraph

5), granting appellant a lien on the property equal to onehalf of the equity value of the home at the time of the
divorce which was computed to be one-half of $20,000.00,
plus interest on the lien at the rate of eight percent (8%)
per annum (R.21,22).
POIWr I
IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THE COURT HAS POWER TO
MAKE MODIFICATIONS OR REVISIONS OF A PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT MORE JUST AND
EQUITABLE.
In equitable proceedings such as divorce, the court has
reserved to it by statute the right to take measures to
insure that its judgment is fair, and will remain so.

Each

court is given the power to make subsequent modifications
and to reconsider a divorce decree whenever inequities or
oversights come about.

In Utah, such proceedings are governed

by U.C.A. 30-3-5, which states in pertinent part:
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_r:._

. . • The court shall have continui!!.9_
jurisd1ct1on to make subsequenLChanges,
or new orders with respect to the support
and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of children and their support and maintenance or the distribution of property as
shall be reasonable and necessary • • •
(Emphasis added.)
This section was designed to empower a court that had
granted a decree of divorce and awarded alimony or had made
distribution of property, to later increase or decrease
alimony or

to

change.the distribution of property to insure

justice bet~een the parties.

Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah2d 329,

437 P.2d 684 (1968); Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah2d 332, 445
P.2d 701 (1968); Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136 (Utah,
1975);

Mitchell~~

Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah,

1974)~

This general rule was stated by the Utah Supreme Court as
follows:
When a divorce is decreed, the court shall
make such order in relation to the children
and property of the parties as may be just
and equitable. Pr.ovided further, that when
it shall appear to the court at a future
time that it would be for the interest of
the parties concerned that a change should
be effected in regard. to the former disposal
of children or distribution of property, the
court shall have power to make such changes
as will be conducive to.the best interests
of all parties concerned.
(Emphasis added)
Whitmore v. Harden, 3 Utah 121, l P.465
(1882), cited as recently as 1969 in Harrison
v. Harrison, 22 utah2d 180, 450 P.2d 457 (1969).
Furthermore, when the

p~rties

have stipulated to a

certain property settlement, the court does not thereby lose
the right to make such modifications or changes thereafter
as may be requested by either party.

Callister v. Callister,
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1 utah2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 {1953); Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah
196, 139 P.2d 222 (1943); Barraclough v.

~arracloµgh,

100

Utah 196, 111 P.2d 792 (1941).
The trial court, then, has the power to modify and
alter a judgment whenever it will render the decision
more just-and equitable for-the parties- involved.

If, upon

consideration of the circumstances and conditions of a
particular case, the division of property by the court seems
inequitable, the court has continuing jurisdiction to make
needed modifications and revisions of the settlement.

With

reference to U.C.A. 30-3-5, the Utah Supreme court in
Iverson v. tverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah,

1974)~

stated that

the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to make such
subsequent changes with respect to distribution of divorced
parties' property as "shall be reasonable and necessary."
In the case at bar, the property settlement described
in paragraph 5 of the original divorce _decree clearly presented problerns--it was inequitable and in need of revision.
The settlement granted the respondent, Mrs. Foulger, all
right, title and interest to the property, subject to a lien
on the premises in behalf of the appellant equal to 50
percent of the amount received from any sale in excess of
$17,000.00, which was the purchase price of the residence
and remaining mortgage obligation at the time of the De·cree
(R.6).
purchase

The appellant was further awarded a first option to
th~

residence in the event of sale, and apply his

equity upon the purchase price (R.6,7).
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For more than four years, Mrs. Foulger made .111 of the
payments on the house, totalling in excess of $6,384.00,
(R.10), paid increasing property taxes and insurance in
excess of $2,160.00 (R.10), and paid for or performed all
upkeep and made major improvements to the residence, increasing
its value {R.10).

Furthermore, she desired to make additional

improvements in the home, namely, insulating and finishing
the basement in order to reduce heating costs.

The appellant,

however, made no financial contribution to the property
after the divorce decree was granted (R.10), yet the original
decree allowed him to share in and benefit from any ongoing
appreciation in value which accrued to the property.
lower

The

court found this settlement to be "inherently unfair,"

and therefore modified paragraph 5 (R.20).
The revised property settlement grants a lien on the
premises in favor of the appellant for one-half of the
appreciation of the home at the time of the divorce in
excess of $17,000.00.

The court valued the home at $37,000.00

at the time of the divorce, and accordingly the amount of
the appellant's lien is one-half of $20,000.00, or $10,000.00
(R.16).

The modification further awarded the appellant

interest on the lien at the rate of eight percent (8%) per
annum, commencing from the date of the ruling (R.16).

This

modification was clearly necessary in order to make the
settlement equitable and to insure substantial justice
between the parties.

Furthermore, such modification was

entirely within the discretion of the trial judge.

The
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particular changes or modifications

ne~ded

to make a divorce

decree more equitable are always a matter of discretion:
The trial court granting a decree of divorce
has continuing jurisdiction over the parties
with regard to the decree, enabling it to
make such subsequent modifications as are
equitable, and the breadth of discretionary
power given.the trial court in the initial
determination of property d1v1s1on extends
in equal measure to the subsequent.mod1f1-:
cations.
(Emphasis added) Mccrary v. McCr~ry,
599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979).
See also Dahlberg
(1930);

Dahlberg,

Pinney·v~-Pinney,

Op~nshaw v~

Buzzo v.

v.

6~ensha~,

Bu~zo,

77 Utah 157, 292 P.214

66 utah 602, 245 P. 329 (1926};

80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932); and

45 Utah 625 148 P. 362 (1915).

A trial-court may, ·therefore, use its broad discretionary
powers in the modification of a property settlement, and
before a decision to modify can be

reversed~

the appellant

has the burden of proving that the trial court abused that
discretion.

Christensen v; Christensen, 21 Utah2d 263, 444

P.2d 511 (1968); Knapp v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 8
Utah2d 220, 332 P. 2d 662 ( 1958).

In the case at bar,. appellant

must show that the evidence clearly preponderates against
the trial court's decision and that modification constituted
substantial, reversible error.

Clearly, the appellant has

failed to meet this burden--all of the evidence indicates
that the trial judge was entirely fair in his decision to
modify.

Since no abuse of discretion can be shown, therefore,

the modification must be upheld.
The more btoad and general rule is that the trial court
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in any equitable matter has a wide range of discretion to
make such orders as may be just--including the review of
previous orders.

See 27 Am.Jur.2d 627, Equity §102.

Sound

discretion is the controlling guide of judicial action in
every phase of a suit in equity.

Pennsylvania v. Williams,

294 U.S. 176 (1935); Slipp v. Amato, 231 Or. 512, 373 P.2d
673 (1962), Hightower v. Bigoney, 145 So.2d 505, (Fla.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 156 So.2d 501; Food Pantry
Limited

v~

Waikiki Business Plaza Inc., 575 P.2d 869 (Hawaii

1978}.
In the trial court's sound discretion the remedies of
equity are molded to the needs of justice and are employed
to protect the equities of all parties.

The flexibility of

equitable jurisdiction permits innovation in remedies to
meet all varieties of circumstances which may arise in any
case.

Ripley v. International R. of Cent. America. 8 App.

Div. 310, 188 N.Y •. S. 2d 62, aff'd 209 N.Y.S. 2d 289, 171
N.E. 2d 443 (1959).
Again, the appellant in the case at bar has failed to
show that this broad range of dis.cretion, granted to the
trial court in equity, was abused, and therefore the
decision of the lower court must be affirmed.
It should be pointed out, furthermore, that the appellant's
brief argues highly inconsistent positions.

Counsel argues

that property settlements should never be modif ied--that the
court should make such settlement agreements "permanent,
final and unreviewable except through normal appeal channels."
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(See pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief.)

Appellant then

agrees, however, that it would be proper and "only fair" to
modify the decree through an amendment, excluding himself
from participation in any increases in value resulting from
improvements made by the respondent.
appellant's brief.)

(See pages 5 and 6 of

Not only is the appellant's argument

against the clear weight of authority in this

state~

its

inconsistencies also make it untenable.
Moreover, the cases cited by the appellant in support
of his argument are all clearly distinguishable from the
case at bar, or stand completely different propositi9ns than
advocated by appellant.
The decision in Kinsey v •. J<insey, 231 Cal. App.2d 219,
41 Cal.Rptr. 802

{196~)

dealt with an interlocutory decree,

not a final divorce decree as in the case at bar.

The case

of Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 360 P.2d 998 ·(1961), cited
by the appellant as stating thaf a decree should not be
modified, in fact states:
Where an agreement is inequitable and
unfair to the wife, equity will not
enforce the agreement but will grant
relief to her even though no actual
fraud or duress was restored to by her
husband in procuring it. Sande, supra
at 1003.
The court in Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P.
200 (1919) did not dictate the rule proscribed by the
appellant that modification is improper in the absence of
fraud, duress or undue influence.

The requested modification

of the decree in Hughes was not allowed because of other
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circumstances, even though misrepresentation was shown.
Both Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440 (1962)
and Ross v. Ross, 403 P.2d 19 (Oregon 1965) cited by appellJnt
in his brif are based on their prospective state laws and
statutes, which are clearly distinguishable from U.C.A. 30-

3-5.
Respondent does not argue with. the requirement of a
change of circumstances in order to modify a decree, as set
forth in Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) since, as
stated in POINT II of this brief, the lower court in the
.case at bar found a change of circumstances sufficient to
modify the property settlement of the decree.
The appellant's argument, therefore, is not substantiated
by case law and is antithetical to the rule proscribed in
U.C.A. 30-3-5.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE.
It is well recognized that a change of circumstances is
necessary in order to modify a divorce decree.

Sorensen v.

Sorensen, 20 Utah2d 360, 438 P.2d 180 (1968); Adams v. Adams,
593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979); Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443
(Utah, 1978).

Although the majority of cases which require

a change of circumstances in order to modify a decree deal
with alimony and child custody, the premise has also been
applied to property distribution.

Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80

Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932).
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In the case at bar, the trial court exptessly found a
change of circumstances sufficient to modify the decree.
The court, in its Findings of Fact '(No. 10), held that the
reason stated by the appellant for including Paragraph 5,
the property settlement, no longer exists.

(R.20)

Appellant

testified in the court below (later contradicted on crossexamination, see R.86) that his main reason for including
the original property settlement in the decree,

reser~ing

in

himself a lien on future appreciation of the residence, was
to let it act as an "inducement" for the respondent, a
native of Germany, to remain in this area (R.15,78).
Respondent testified that she knew nothing of this agreement
between the appellant and the parties' former attorney to
place the particular property settlement provisions in the
decree solely for this reason, and_ would not have agreed to
such had she know of it.
Since the divorce

(R.99,100)

decr~e

was granted, the respondent

has obtained a teaching certificate and local employment as
a school teacher, has remained in the residef:ice for more
than four years and lived in the United States a total of
sixteen years.

(R.52,57)

Any doubts, therefore, that the

appellant may have had as to whether the respondent would
remain in this area, are now totally unfounded and without
basis.

The trial court, therefore, found that a change of

circumstances did exist--the appellant's reason for

includi~

the original property settlement was.no longer tenable or
just.
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Furthermore, a change of circumstances existed by
reason of the fact that respondent, since the divorce
decree, had made all payments on the home, insurance and
taxes, and had made substantial improvements to the residence,
all without the benefit of financial assistance from the
appellant.

(R. 20,21)

These findings come to the Supreme. Court clothed with
verity, and should not be disturbed unless the appellant
demonstrates that in making such findings the trial court
abused its discretion.

As mentioned in Point I, above,

appellant has the burden of proving that the trial court's
findings of fact and decision to modify under 30-3-5 were
clearly erroneous, and constituted substantial, reversible
error.

Knapp v·. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 8 Utah2d 220,

332 P.2d 662 {1958); Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc.,
548 P.2d 898 {Utah 1976); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974); Brunson v.
Strong, 17 Utah2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Lee v. Howes,
548 P.2d 619 (1976); Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah
1974).
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COST
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
The established rule in Utah is that an award of attorney's
fees on appeal are entirely within the discretion of the.
Supreme Court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate &·Inv. Co., 3

Utah2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); Eastman v. Eastman, 558
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P.2d 514, 516 (Utah 1976).

& Error, §1022.

See also S Am.Jur.2d 445, Appeal

In cases where the modification of a divorcie

decree has been appealed, the Supreme Court has seen fit to
award attorney's fees to the party who has been forced to
follow through and defend an appeal commenced by the.opposing
party,.

This court in Kiger· v. Kiger, 29 Utah2d 167, 506

P.2d 441 (1973), a case involving similar circumstances to
the case at

bar~

stated:

The wife, respondent, on appeal from the
second amended divorce decree, was entitled to attorney's fees and the case
should be remanded for taking of evidence
• • • and an appropriate award of attorney's
fe·es for services performed by the wife's
counsel on appeal.
See also Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422
P.2d 534 (1967).
The case at bar is clearly within general rule described
by this Court in Kiger, supra.

Since the defendant pursued

this appeal and plaintiff, the prevailing party, was compelled
to respond, the cost of attorney's fees on appeal should be
awarded to the plaintiff.

See Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706

(Utah, 1977).
CONCLUSION
Paragraph 5, the property settlement in the original
divorce decree, was clearly in need of revision and modification. The settlement was inequitable and unjustly allowed
the appellant to benefit from the appreciation in value of
property to which he was making no financial contribution.
The trial court had continuing jurisdiction and statutory
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power, granted by

U.C.A.

30-3-5, to modify the property

settlement in order to reflect justice between the parties.
Furthermore, the trial court found that a change of circumstances did exist sufficient to justify a modification of
the property settlement. Since the appellant has failed to
show in any way that the trial judge abused his discretion,
the findings and modification of .the trial court must stand,
and the cost of attorney's fees on appeal should be awarded
to the respondent.
Respectfully submitted this /6-rkday of June, 1980.

CRA~et;_{~y:::!' ff rc0

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing to Mr. Neall T.
Wootton, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Suite 12, Geneva
Building, American Fork, Utah, 84003, this

---

day of June,

1980.
SECRe·rARY
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